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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3530 
 ___________ 
 
 POLICE OFFICER WILLIE COLEY, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
COUNTY OF ESSEX; ESSEX COUNTY PROSECUTOR‟S OFFICE; 
INVESTIGATOR QUOVELLA SPRUILL; JOHN/JANE DOE 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-04325) 
 District Judge:  Honorable William J. Martini 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 12, 2011 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed May 26, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Willie Coley appeals pro se from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Essex County Prosecutor‟s Office (“ECPO”) and one of its 
investigators, Quovella Spruill.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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 Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, we will not 
recite them except as necessary to the discussion.  Coley was accused of sexually abusing 
his girlfriend‟s daughter, A.H., who was then 15 years old.  A.H. had disclosed the abuse 
to a friend, who notified a school counselor.  The counselor, in turn, notified the New 
Jersey Department of Human Services, Office of Children‟s Services (“DYFS”) 
representative, which opened an investigation.  The next day, March 1, 2007, two DYFS 
workers interviewed A.H. at her school.  The DYFS then brought A.H. to the Child 
Advocacy Center, where she met with another DYFS representative, Detective Spruill, 
and Detective Spruill‟s supervisor.  That evening, Detective Spruill took two statements 
from A.H., in which she claimed that Coley had sexually abused her since she was eight 
years-old, provided details concerning when, where, and how the abuse occurred, and 
explained that Coley had sex with her two weeks earlier.  These allegations were 
consistent with A.H.‟s previous accounts of the abuse. 
 Meanwhile, Detective Spruill received approval from an assistant prosecutor in the 
ECPO‟s Child Abuse Unit to set up and record telephone conversations between Coley 
and A.H., and between Coley and A.H‟s mother.  During those conversations, Coley 
appeared to be aware of the allegations being made against him but did not offer a clear 
denial.  After reviewing the evidence, the assistant prosecutor determined that probable 
cause existed to arrest Coley on various charges, including sexual assault, aggravated 
sexual assault, and endangering the welfare of a child.  Detective Spruill signed 
complaints in support of the arrest warrant that night, and presented them, along with 
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A.H.‟s statements and draft transcripts of the telephone conversations, to a municipal 
judge.  The judge authorized Coley‟s arrest.  The next day, March 2, 2007, Coley turned 
himself in to the Montclair Police Department; he remained incarcerated for 37 days. 
 On March 15, 2007, A.H. submitted to physical and psychological examinations.  
The doctor who performed the physical examination concluded that it “neither 
confirm[ed] nor exclude[d] sexual abuse.”  Following the psychological examination, in 
which A.H. again described the abuse, the psychologist concluded that “[A.H.‟s] clinical 
presentation, her reports of the abuse to her friends, the police, the Essex County 
Prosecutor‟s Office, the . . . pediatrician who evaluated her medically, and the 
information shared with the undersigned are consistent with the clinical profile of 
children who have been sexually victimized.”   During both examinations, A.H. claimed 
that she regretted disclosing the abuse because of the effect it had on her family and 
Coley. 
 Detective Spruill continued to investigate when, on March 21, 2007, she received 
a telephone call from A.H., who sought to change her statement.  Specifically, A.H. told 
Detective Spruill that “[s]ome of the things I said happened, didn‟t exactly happen.”  
According to A.H., while Coley had inappropriately touched her “a lot actually,” “it was 
only one time he actually tried to have sex with [her.]”   A.H. explained that since coming 
forward with the allegations “[e]verything [was] getting worse, nothing [was] getting 
better, nothing at all.”  A.H. further stated that she had “divided [her family] apart” and 
expressed concern that her “mother . . . thinks she‟s in jeopardy of losing” her children.  
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After speaking with A.H., Detective Spruill submitted a written report to the prosecutor‟s 
office which described the phone conversation with A.H.  Approximately ten months 
later, on January 28, 2008, A.H. and her mother spoke to Detective Spruill and an 
assistant prosecutor.  At this meeting, A.H. recanted her allegations, claiming that no 
sexual abuse had occurred.  A.H. explained that she had lied because, among other 
reasons, she felt no one in her family was paying attention to her.  Despite the 
recantation, the prosecutor‟s office sought to indict Coley.  The case was presented to a 
grand jury in February 2008, but no indictment was issued. 
 In August 2008, Coley, then represented by counsel, filed the present action 
alleging federal civil rights and state law causes of action based upon his arrest, 
incarceration, and prosecution.
1
  The District Court granted the defendants‟ motion for 
summary judgment, holding that Detective Spruill had probable cause to arrest Coley and  
that the ECPO was entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
2
  Coley 
appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over an 
                                                 
 
1
 In addition to Detective Spruill and the ECPO, Coley also named as defendants 
the County of Essex and “John/Jane Doe” defendants.  Later, however, Coley agreed to 
dismiss the County without prejudice and he never identified the “John/Jane Doe” 
defendants.  Regarding the § 1983 claims, Coley alleged violations of his rights under the 
Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments.  He later conceded that there were no Eighth 
Amendment violations and he never disputed that his citation to the Fifth Amendment 
was erroneous. 
 
 
2
 The District Court also dismissed a conspiracy claim and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over various state law claims.  To the extent that Coley 
challenges these dismissals on appeal, we conclude that the District Court did not err. 
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order granting a motion for summary judgment.  Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 
217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review 
reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (amended Dec. 1, 2010).  
“We review the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered.”  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 
10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 “It is well-established that the Fourth Amendment „prohibits a police officer from 
arresting a citizen except upon probable cause.‟”  Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 211 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  “Probable cause exists where the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer‟s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a 
reasonable person to believe an offense had been committed.”  United States v. McGlory, 
968 F.2d 309, 342 (3d Cir. 1992).  Where, as here, an arrest is made pursuant to a 
warrant, “[a] plaintiff may succeed in a § 1983 action for false arrest . . . if [he] shows, by 
a preponderance of the evidence:  (1) that the police officer „knowingly and deliberately, 
or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a 
falsehood in applying for a warrant;‟ and (2) that „such statements or omissions are 
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.‟”  Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d  
781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 
1997)). 
 We agree that there was probable cause to arrest Coley on March 1, 2007.  At that 
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time, Detective Spruill knew that A.H. had given several consistent accounts of the 
abuse.  In addition to telling a friend, A.H. described the abuse to two DYFS workers 
who came to her school.  Later that day, she repeated the story to another DYFS worker.  
A.H. also detailed the abuse in an interview with Detective Spruill, who was able to 
evaluate A.H.‟s demeanor.  According to the assistant prosecutor, A.H.‟s behavior and 
story were consistent with that of a child sex abuse victim.  For instance, A.H. had first 
disclosed the abuse to a friend and her version of events was consistent with a 
“grooming” process, whereby the abuse escalates over time.  Finally, Coley had not 
clearly denied the allegations in the recorded telephone conversations. 
 We also conclude that there is no evidence that Detective Spruill made false 
statements or omissions in support of the warrant.  Detective Spruill stated in a 
declaration that “[in] the late night or March 1, 2007, or the early morning of March 2, 
2007, two officers of the Montclair Police Department and I went to the home of” a 
magistrate judge.  After reviewing copies of A.H‟s two statements and transcripts of the 
telephone conversations, the judge asked Detective Spruill whether she believed A.H.  
Detective Spruill “responded in the affirmative.”  Coley does not challenge the accuracy 
of A.H.‟s statements, the telephone transcripts, or Detective Spruill‟s account of her 
interaction with the judge.  Rather, he asserts that Detective Spruill should have directed 
that A.H. be given a polygraph test and undergo a physical examination.  Significantly, 
however, Detective Spruill was not “required to undertake an exhaustive investigation in 
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order to validate the probable cause that, in [her] mind, already existed.”3  Merkle v. 
Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 790 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 Additionally, the probable cause to arrest Coley was not dispelled by the results of 
A.H.‟s physical examination or by her statements to Detective Spruill on March 21, 2007, 
while Coley was still incarcerated.  See Wilson, 212 F.3d at 792-93 (holding that 
“[r]egardless of the existence and scope of an officer‟s duty to seek to release a suspect 
when probable cause no longer exists, or the level of knowledge that he or she must have 
in order to trigger that duty, the interview [with a witness who provided a partial alibi] 
clearly did not dispel the earlier probable cause.”).  The physical examination “neither 
confirm[ed] nor exclude[d] sexual abuse” and, while A.H. changed her story to clarify 
that Coley had only tried to have sex with her once, she maintained that the abuse had 
otherwise occurred as originally reported.  See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 
(9
th
 Cir. 2001) (stating that “[i]nterviewers of child witnesses of suspected sexual abuse 
must be given some latitude in determining when to credit witnesses‟ denials and when to 
discount them, and we are not aware of any federal law—constitutional, decisional, or 
statutory—that indicates precisely where the line must be drawn.”).  In any event, 
Detective Spruill immediately provided the ECPO with a written description of the 
changes A.H. sought to make to her story.  Cf. Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 
                                                 
 
3
 We also reject Coley‟s argument, made for the first time on appeal, that the 
investigation leading to the determination that probable cause existed was so inadequate 
as to violate his substantive due process rights.  See Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 
F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that liability exists only for “the most egregious 
official conduct” that is “so ill-conceived or malicious that it „shocks the conscience.‟” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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(5
th
 Cir. 1992) (“[F]ailure to disclose . . . undeniably credible and patently exculpatory 
evidence to the prosecuting attorney‟s office plainly exposes [defendant police officer] to 
liability under § 1983.”).   Because probable cause existed throughout Coley‟s 
incarceration, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. 
 Finally, we agree that the ECPO, to the extent that it is a governmental entity 
which can be sued under § 1983, is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  
Under the Eleventh Amendment, “an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in 
federal courts by her own citizens.”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).  
Eleventh Amendment immunity protects not only states but also state agencies, “as long 
as the state is the real party in interest.”  Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 
873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).  To determine whether Eleventh Amendment 
immunity applies, we consider:  “(1) the source of the money that would pay for the 
judgment; (2) the status of the entity under state law; and (3) the entity‟s degree of 
autonomy.”  Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (citing Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659).  We have concluded that “[w]hen [New 
Jersey] county prosecutors engage in classic law enforcement and investigative functions, 
they act as officers of the State.”  Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996).  
Immunity may not apply, however, when prosecutorial defendants “perform 
administrative tasks unrelated to their strictly prosecutorial functions, such as . . . 
personnel decisions.”  Id.  Because the decision to present the case against Coley to a 
grand jury is clearly a law enforcement function, the ECPO qualifies for immunity.  To 
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the extent that Coley‟s claims against the ECPO are based on training and policy 
decisions which required legal knowledge and discretion, the ECPO is likewise immune 
from suit.  See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 861-63 (2009). 
 For the reasons given, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
